The Prevent Strategy: Radicalisation Definitions, Evolution, and Concerns Over Criminalisation of British Patriotism

Introduction

This article examines the UK government’s Prevent strategy, established in 2003 to counter Islamic terrorism following the 9/11 attacks, and argues that its evolution represents a deliberate shift away from addressing the primary threat of Islamic extremism—evidenced by attacks like the 7/7 London bombings and Manchester Arena bombing—towards targeting British citizens who uphold Judeo-Christian cultural values.

Drawing on official sources and commentator Connor Tomlinson’s claims, it highlights how the Home Office, influenced by civil servants and ideologically-driven interest groups like the Islamic Network embedded in the civil service, has redirected Prevent to scrutinise lawful patriotism, risking breaches of British Constitutional protections and democratic accountability. The article traces key changes, critiques their implications, and assesses their legality under the UK’s Constitutional framework.

What Constitutes Radicalisation Under Prevent?

The UK government’s Prevent strategy, a core component of the counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST, defines radicalisation as “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism that may lead to terrorism.”

Extremism, as updated in March 2024, is defined as “the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred, or intolerance” that aims to:

1. Negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others;

2. Undermine, overturn, or replace the UK’s system of liberal Parliamentary democracy and democratic rights; or

3. Intentionally create a permissive environment for the above.

   
   

Indicators of radicalisation include behavioural changes such as withdrawal, expressing extremist views, increased isolation, or fixation on ideologies, often influenced by online content or extremist groups. The Prevent programme emphasises early intervention through the Channel programme, offering tailored support like mentoring or education to divert individuals from extremist ideologies.

Establishment of Prevent and Its Original Purpose

Prevent was introduced in 2003 under the Labour government of Tony Blair, following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, perpetrated by al-Qaeda, an Islamist terrorist group. Its primary aim was to safeguard individuals from becoming involved in terrorism, with a clear focus on countering Islamic terrorism, which was seen as the root of major attacks, including the 7/7 London bombings (2005, 52 deaths) and the Manchester Arena bombing (2017, 22 deaths). The strategy initially targeted personal, ideological, and social factors driving Islamist radicalisation, reflecting the urgent need to address this dominant threat.

Timeline of Prevent Strategy Changes and Key Figures

The UK government’s Prevent strategy has undergone significant changes since 2003, shifting from a focus on Islamic terrorism to a broader, vaguer approach that increasingly targets British patriots and British cultural values that spring from Britain’s fundamental Judaeo-Christian heritage and history.

Key milestones include:

• 2003: Prevent established under Home Secretary David Blunkett (Cabinet Secretary: Sir Andrew Turnbull). Focused on countering Islamist terrorism post-9/11.

  
  

• 2007: The Research, Information, and Communications Unit (RICU) was created under Home Secretary John Reid (Cabinet Secretary: Sir Gus O’Donnell) to support Prevent with propaganda and messaging, often targeting Muslim communities to counter extremism narratives.

  
  

• 2011: Major overhaul under Home Secretary Theresa May (Cabinet Secretary: Sir Gus O’Donnell). Prevent broadened to address all forms of extremism, including non-violent extremism, with a budget of £46 million. Lord Carlile endorsed this shift, but critics noted a dilution of focus on Islamist threats.

  
  

• 2015: Prevent Duty introduced under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (Home Secretary: Theresa May; Cabinet Secretary: Sir Jeremy Heywood). Public bodies like schools were required to monitor for radicalisation, embedding surveillance in Muslim communities.

  
  

• 2023: CONTEST updated under Home Secretary Suella Braverman (Cabinet Secretary: Simon Case). The Prevent Duty Guidance explicitly states: “Vocal or active support for British cultural values or national symbols, when combined with other indicators of extremist ideology, may contribute to a risk of radicalisation.” This marked a deliberate shift toward scrutinising British patriotism.

  
  

• 2024 (March): New extremism definition published under Home Secretary James Cleverly (Cabinet Secretary: Simon Case). It focused on ideologies promoting violence, hatred, or intolerance, further broadening the scope to potentially include lawful cultural expressions.

  
  

• 2024 (December): Home Secretary Yvette Cooper and Security Minister Dan Jarvis (Cabinet Secretary: Simon Case) announced further reforms, including youth diversion orders and increased funding (£140 million for police, £499 million for intelligence). A permanent Independent Prevent Commissioner was proposed.

Civil servants, notably Permanent Secretaries like Sir Philip Rutnam (2017–2020) and Matthew Rycroft (2020–present), have overseen these changes, with RICU playing a pivotal role in shaping messaging, developing and maintaining a particular narrative.

Commentator Connor Tomlinson alleges a 700-member Home Office Islamic Network has influenced RICU and Prevent, prioritising Muslim interests and diluting focus on Islamist extremism [Tomlinson, Substack].

Deliberate Shift from Islamic Terrorism to attack on British Cultural Values

The UK government’s Prevent strategy has not evolved organically to address new risks but has been deliberately redirected by government officials, civil servants, and interest groups, notably the Home Office’s Islamic Network and RICU, to downplay Islamic terrorism while targeting British citizens who uphold Judaeo-Christian cultural values.

Initially designed to counter the clear threat of Islamic terrorism—evidenced by 9/11, the 7/7 bombings, and the Manchester Arena attack—Prevent’s focus has shifted significantly. Statistics underscore that Islamist terrorism remains the primary threat, accounting for 67% of attacks since 2018 and 75% of MI5’s caseload in 2023, yet only 16% of Prevent referrals in 2021–22 were Islamist-related, indicating a stark misalignment [Home Office, 2023].

The 2023 Prevent Duty Guidance explicitly identifies “vocal or active support for British cultural values or national symbols” as a potential radicalisation indicator when paired with “extremist ideology,” a vague term that risks encompassing lawful expressions of patriotism, such as displaying the Union Flag or advocating for British heritage.

This shift is not driven by public demand but by the UK government, influenced by internal networks and external advocacy. No political Party has shared their intention to pursue this attack on British people holding to love of nation, nor has there ever been any consultation or referendum on the subject. Government has gone out on a limb on this and the question is Why?

Connor Tomlinson alleges that a 700-member Home Office Islamic Network, embedded within the Civil Service, has shaped Prevent through RICU, prioritising Muslim community interests and downplaying Islamist extremism.

For example, RICU’s campaigns, such as “Don’t Look Back in Anger” following the Manchester Arena bombing, aimed to rehabilitate Islam’s image rather than address the ideological roots of the attack [Tomlinson, Substack].This redirection is further evidenced by the William Shawcross Review (2023), which criticised Prevent for applying a lower threshold to “extreme right-wing” ideologies—sometimes including centre-right commentators—while narrowly defining Islamist extremism, allowing some extremist groups to operate unchecked [Shawcross Review, 2023].

Tomlinson claims RICU has been influenced by proscribed groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, citing its ties to Breakthrough Media, which produced campaigns like “Help for Syria” to target Muslim audiences without disclosing government involvement [Tomlinson, Substack]. These efforts suggest a deliberate attempt to shift scrutiny from Islamic terrorism, rooted in ideologies like Salafism (an Islamic movement seeking to purify Islam from Western influences, and promotes jihadist ideologies in some factions, linking it to radicalisation concerns in Prevent) toward British citizens expressing cultural nationalism or Judeo-Christian values, which Tomlinson argues are fundamental to British identity.

The UK government’s focus on “community cohesion” and accusations of “Islamophobia” has further diluted Prevent’s effectiveness against Islamist threats.

The Runnymede Trust’s 1997 introduction of “Islamophobia” into public discourse, coinciding with Blair’s government, has been used to deflect criticism of Islamist extremism, framing it as cultural bias. This narrative, amplified by RICU’s propaganda efforts, contrasts with the lack of evidence linking mainstream British patriotism—rooted in Judeo-Christian traditions like charity, individual liberty, and the rule of law—to terrorism, unlike the well-documented risks of Islamist ideologies.

Legal and Democratic Concerns: Unlawful and Ultra Vires?

The UK government’s Prevent strategy’s evolution, particularly the 2023 guidance and 2024 extremism definition, raises significant legal and democratic concerns. The UK’s unwritten constitution, rooted in statutes like the Magna Carta (1215), the Bill of Rights (1689), and case law, guarantees freedoms of expression, association, and thought, subject to reasonable limits.

The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), protecting these rights under Articles 9, 10, and 11.  The 2023 guidance’s vague reference to “support for British cultural values or national symbols” as a potential radicalisation indicator, alongside the 2024 definition’s broad terms like “intolerance” or “undermine,” risks overreach by capturing lawful patriotic expressions.

This could be deemed ultra vires if it exceeds the Home Office’s powers under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, which requires proportionality. Case law, such as R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991], establishes that executive actions must align with statutory intent and not infringe on fundamental rights without clear justification.

Moreover, the lack of robust Parliamentary scrutiny and public consultation on the 2023 guidance and 2024 definition undermines democratic legitimacy. The Home Affairs Committee’s inquiry into extremism (ongoing as of July 2025) highlights concerns about Prevent’s effectiveness and proportionality, but no evidence suggests comprehensive public or stakeholder engagement on these changes.

Organisations promoting British values or the Union Flag, such as veterans’ groups or cultural societies, have not been visibly consulted, risking perceptions of top-down imposition. This contravenes principles of democratic accountability enshrined in the UK’s constitutional framework, where significant policy shifts require transparent justification and debate.

Conclusion

The UK government’s Prevent strategy, established in 2003 to counter Islamic terrorism post-9/11, has been deliberately redirected by government officials, civil servants, and ideological-driven interest groups like the Home Office Islamic Network and RICU.

This shift has moved focus from the primary threat of Islamic terrorism—evidenced by 67% of attacks since 2018—toward scrutinising British citizens who uphold Judeo-Christian cultural values, as seen in the 2023 guidance targeting support for national symbols.  This redirection, not driven by public demand but by internal agendas, risks criminalising lawful patriotism, chilling free speech, and undermining constitutional protections.

The lack of democratic scrutiny and potential ultra vires application of Prevent’s powers demand urgent reform to realign the strategy with its original purpose and respect British identity.

Evolution of Prevent’s Extremism Definitions and Radicalisation Indicators Threatening Free Speech and Leading to Criminalisation of British Patriotism

Aspect	Original Definition (2011)	Current Definition (March 2024)	Home Office Examples of Radicalisation Aspects
Definition of Extremism	“Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.”	“The promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred, or intolerance that aims to: (1) negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; (2) undermine, overturn, or replace the UK’s system of liberal Parliamentary democracy and democratic rights; or (3) intentionally create a permissive environment for the above.”	N/A (Definitions do not include specific examples, but radicalisation aspects below illustrate application.)
Scope	Focused on opposition to “British values,” often targeting Islamist ideologies but risking broad application to dissent.	Broadened to include ideologies promoting violence, hatred, or intolerance, potentially capturing lawful cultural expressions.	N/A (Scope is conceptual, but examples below reflect deliberate broadening.)
Key Focus	Emphasised non-violent extremism and opposition to British values, primarily aimed at Islamist threats post-7/7 bombings.	Shifts to ideologies tied to violence, hatred, or intolerance, but 2023 guidance targets British cultural support, diluting focus on Islamist threats.	- Ideological Exposure: Adopting extreme right-wing views via online antisemitic or anti-immigrant content. - Grievance Narratives: Youth influenced by narratives blaming communities for societal issues, supporting violence. - Permissive Environments: Unchallenged extremist rhetoric (e.g., blasphemy justifying violence). - 2023 Guidance: “Vocal or active support for British cultural values or national symbols” (e.g., Union Flag displays with anti-immigrant views) as a risk factor, shifting focus from Islamist threats to Judeo-Christian patriotism.
Potential Implications	Risked capturing dissent critical of government policy, but primarily focused on Islamist extremism.	Risks criminalising lawful patriotism due to vague terms like “intolerance,” driven by RICU and Islamic Network influence, downplaying Islamist threats.	- Misapplication Risk: Teenagers fixated on violent content referred to Prevent, but patriotic acts like flag-waving misjudged as “extremist.” - Channel Cases (2023/24): 45% extreme right-wing (e.g., neo-Nazi symbols), 23% Islamist (e.g., Hizb ut-Tahrir support), 18% conflicted ideologies. - 2023 Guidance Concern: Risks chilling free speech by targeting British cultural support, echoing authoritarian tactics.
Examples of Radicalisation Indicators	General indicators: support for terrorist groups or rejecting democratic principles, focused on Islamist threats like al-Qaeda.	Emphasises ideological, personal, and social factors, but 2023 guidance includes British cultural support as a risk.	- Behavioural Changes: Withdrawal, isolation, or expressing extremist views (e.g., glorifying terrorist acts). - Online Influence: Exposure to Islamist or right-wing propaganda online. - Susceptibility Factors: Mental health issues or grievances exploited by extremists. - 2023 Guidance: Support for British symbols or values (e.g., Union Flag, Christian heritage) when paired with vague “extremist ideology,” risking misapplication to lawful acts.